Irides: Weekly global patent litigation update

This edition features updates from: Australia, USA and the Unified Patent Court (UPC).

The Irides Weekly Update is our round-up of patent litigation news highlights from around the world.
 

Stop Press Australia

Appeal hearing on PTE eligibility for formulation patents.
[Otsuka Pharmaceutical et al. v Sun Pharma]

On 16 -17 June, the High Court of Australia (the Court of final appeal in Australia) heard an appeal of the 2025 Full Federal Court decision which held that formulation patents did not constitute “pharmaceutical substances” and therefore were not entitled to Patent Term Extensions (previously reported on here).

A decision is expected in the coming months and will be covered in a future Irides Weekly Update once the judgment is available.
 

USA

Eastern District of Texas holds that an NPE can establish irreparable harm and inadequacy of monetary relief.
[Collision v Samsung]

On 17 May 2026, the Eastern District of Texas handed down its decision in Collision v Samsung. Following an earlier trial in which Samsung was found to have infringed four of Collision’s patents and damages were awarded, Collision sought a permanent injunction in respect of one of those patents.

The Court rejected Collision’s submission that a permanent injunction is a presumptive remedy in patent cases and instead applied the four-factor test for injunctive relief set out by the Supreme Court in eBay v MercExchange. Under that test, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate: (1) irreparable injury; (2) the inadequacy of monetary damages; (3) that the balance of hardships between the parties favours an injunction; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by the injunction.

In relation to limb (1), Collision argued that ongoing infringement constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of equity. Samsung countered that a non-practising entity (NPE) (i.e. an entity that owns but does not itself exploit a patent) will rarely suffer irreparable harm.

On these two issues, both the USPTO and the DOJ filed statements of interest rejecting the parties’ categorical positions. The Court agreed, holding that: (A) there is no rule that ongoing infringement constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law; and (B) NPEs are capable of establishing irreparable harm. The Court emphasised that patents are property rights and should not be differentiated based on use: even “unused” patents may be difficult to value, and damages may be difficult to calculate.

The Court found in favour of Collision on eBay factor (1), relying in particular on the loss of a design-win opportunity (i.e. the lock-in and incumbency impact and goodwill accrued from having its technology be adopted legitimately by Samsung) and Samsung’s ongoing infringement. Under factor (2), the Court also found that monetary damages would be inadequate. However, it rejected Collision’s submission that patent infringement can never be remedied by damages alone. It also rejected Samsung’s argument that any patent holder that licenses its patents is necessarily limited to monetary relief.

Despite these findings, the Court ultimately denied the injunction, holding that Collision had failed to satisfy the remaining eBay factors: (3) the balance of hardships, where both parties’ submissions were criticised; and (4) the public interest, where the Court held that general assertions about the importance of enforcing patent rights were insufficient.
 

UPC

Mannheim Local Division grants injunction against Disney in respect of InterDigital’s video streaming patent.
[InterDigital v Disney UPC_CFI_86/2025]

On 16 June 2026, the Mannheim Local Division (LD), granted relief, including an injunction, against the Defendants (Disney) in respect of InterDigital’s (IDC) EP 2 465 265, a patent relating to intra chroma encoding and decoding of video data. 

The Court considered the asserted claims were valid and infringed based on the encoding method and encoded bitstream used in the Disney+ streaming service. Disney had raised a FRAND defence, arguing that IDC was not entitled to an injunction to the standard-essential patent, as this would be an abuse of dominance. IDC, on the other hand, argued that the asserted claims were not FRAND-encumbered as they related to encoding and as such did not fall within the scope of the HEVC standard which it contended only specifies the result of the decoding process. IDC argued that in any event, Disney had not behaved as a willing licensee.

For the purpose of assessing the FRAND defence, the Court assumed in Disney’s favour (without making any positive findings on the issue) that the asserted claims were at least de facto standard-essential and confer a dominant position on IDC such that the CJEU principles from Huawei/ZTE apply. However, the Court nevertheless dismissed Disney’s FRAND defence on the basis that it had not acted as a willing licensee by (i) requesting the inclusion of a clause in the NDA which prevented the parties from submitting the full negotiation history to the Court and refusing to properly cooperate to amend the NDA in the context of the proceedings; and (ii) in its counter-offer, not engaging substantively with IDC’s offer to help move negotiations forward. 

The Court therefore awarded the injunction sought in the 11 UPC contracting member states where the patent is in force. Disney requested that the relief be conditioned upon the provision of appropriate security by IDC, which Disney contended should be at least €500 million to cover the damages it would suffer by enforcement of the first instance judgment. The Court agreed to condition enforcement on the provision of security, but considered Disney had not substantiated that their loss of revenue would amount to €500 million in one year and so in the “absence of better information” set the enforcement security at €8 million (the value of the infringement action as previously set in the proceedings by the judge-rapporteur). 

UPC

Court of Appeal confirms Local Divisions’ discretion in value in dispute assessments.
[Speed Care v Teleflex UPC_CoA_85/2026]

On 10 June 2026, the Court of Appeal (CoA) issued an order dismissing Speed Care’s request for discretionary review concerning the value in dispute set by the Hamburg Local Division (LD) in proceedings concerning EP 2 077 811. 

The Hamburg LD had issued a decision which dismissed Teleflex’s infringement action, revoked several claims of the patent in suit, and set the value in dispute for both the infringement action and the counterclaim for revocation at €1,000,000 in the operative part of the decision.

Following the decision, Speed Care filed an application to the LD, within the 15-day window, to have the value in dispute for the counterclaim for revocation increased to €1,500,000 (relying on the Guidelines for the Determination of Court Fees and the Ceiling of Recoverable Costs), and in the alternative requested leave to appeal pursuant to r.220.2 RoP. The Court did not respond to the application within 15 days, which led to Speed Care filing a request for a discretionary review of the order directly with the CoA, without the leave of the Hamburg LD.

The CoA agreed with Speed Care that a determination of the value in dispute is in fact a procedural decision governed by r. 220.2 and 220.3. Its inclusion in the operative part of the final decision rather than a standalone decision did not make it a final decision within the meaning of r.220.1(a), therefore, it could either be appealed with the final decision, or separately, provided that the conditions of r.220.2 and 220.3 are fulfilled.

The Court also held that where the Court of First Instance fails to respond to a timely request for leave to appeal within the 15-day period under r.220.3, this silence should be treated as a refusal to grant leave to appeal. The applicant may therefore file a request for discretionary review to the CoA within 15 days from the end of that first 15-day period under r.220.3. Otherwise, it would allow a Court of First Instance to circumvent a possible appeal through inaction, which would be incompatible with the regime set out in r.220.3 and Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Speed Care’s request for discretionary review was therefore admissible. 

On the merits, however, the request was dismissed. The Court found that the LD’s determination of the value in dispute of the counterclaim for revocation was not manifestly incorrect, and rejected Speed Care’s argument that the Guidelines obliged the Court to set the value of a revocation counterclaim at 150% of the infringement value. The LD had exercised its discretion, having considered the relevant circumstances including the size of Speed Care and the short remaining lifetime of the patent.
 

UPC

Hamburg Local Division orders security for costs against Florida-based claimant based on financial position and pledged patent portfolio.
[Infoblox v Nixu UPC_CFI_360/2026]

On 10 June 2026, the Hamburg LD ordered Nixu FL IP Protection LLC (Nixu) to provide security for costs of €200,000 in infringement proceedings brought by Nixu against Infoblox Inc. and others (together Infoblox) concerning EP 2 005 696.

Infoblox sought security for costs on two main grounds. First, it argued that Nixu did not have sufficient assets to satisfy a potential costs award. Second, it argued that, because Nixu was domiciled in Florida, enforcement of a UPC costs award would be costly and uncertain.

As regards Nixu’s financial position, Infoblox argued that Nixu appeared to be a mere litigation vehicle. It had acquired the patent portfolio from FusionLayer Oy shortly after its incorporation and commenced the proceedings less than two weeks after the transfer of ownership was recorded. Infoblox also relied on US Securities and Exchange Commission filings made by Nixu’s holding company, SIM IP Inc. Those filings indicated that Nixu’s expenses, including the costs of these proceedings, were covered by advances from a third party; that assets acquired by Nixu were pledged to a third party; and that Nixu had also pledged all income, including licence royalties, from its patents. Infoblox therefore argued that any future licensing income generated by Nixu’s patent portfolio could not be relied upon to satisfy a potential costs order. 

As regards enforcement in Florida, Infoblox argued that Florida law allows a court to refuse recognition of a foreign judgment where the cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to Florida public policy. It also relied on Florida law requirements concerning reciprocity and due process. Infoblox submitted that, given the UPC’s front-loaded procedure, limited discovery, limited opportunity to cross-examine experts, loser-pays costs regime and relative newness as a court, there was a realistic risk that a Florida court would refuse to recognise or enforce a UPC costs award.

Nixu disputed both grounds. It argued that it had a stable financial position and that Infoblox had not identified any instance in which Nixu had failed to meet a financial obligation. As regards the pledge over its patent portfolio and future royalties, Nixu argued that the pledge did not extinguish ownership of the portfolio. It therefore remained an asset that could provide recourse for a costs award.

On enforcement, Nixu argued that Florida law provides a general rule of recognition, subject only to narrow exceptions. It submitted that the procedural differences identified by Infoblox, including the UPC’s loser-pays principle, would not meet the high threshold required for the public policy exception under Florida law.

On the facts, the Court held that Nixu’s financial position justified an order for security. It considered it significant that Nixu was a newly incorporated entity, had no credit history, and appeared to have been established as a single-purpose vehicle for the present proceedings. The Court also placed weight on the pledge over Nixu’s patent portfolio and future income. Although Nixu remained the legal owner of the portfolio, the Court held that the pledge of its assets and revenue called into question whether the portfolio could effectively serve as recourse for a potential costs award. The fact that the portfolio had not yet been fully paid for, with a remaining balance of $2 million to be paid from proceeds generated by Nixu, further supported the Court’s conclusion that Nixu was “mainly illiquid”. Its financial position therefore gave rise to a legitimate and real concern that a potential costs award might not be recoverable. 

By contrast, the Court rejected Infoblox’s argument based on enforcement in Florida. It held that Infoblox had not shown any practice of non-recognition in Florida, or that non-recognition of UPC costs awards was seriously to be expected. The Court considered that Florida’s requirements concerning public policy, reciprocity and fair trial principles reflected international standards also present in European jurisdictions. Those requirements did not, of themselves, justify an order for security for costs.

As to quantum, the Court rejected Infoblox’s request for security of €1 million. It assessed the combined value of the infringement claim and potential counterclaim for revocation at €2.5 million, giving rise to a recoverable costs ceiling of €400,000. Balancing Infoblox’s interest in security against Nixu’s right to an effective remedy and a fair hearing, the Court ordered security of €200,000, representing 50% of that ceiling. 

New episodes: You, Me and the UPC: Case by case

Episode 64: Hamburg Local Division penalises defendants for website and marketplace offerings despite disclaimers

Episode 65: Lisbon Local Division provides guidance on revocation of expired patents and online infringement