Irides: Weekly global patent litigation update

This edition features updates from: The United Kingdom (UK), Germany/China/UPC, the United States of America (USA) and the Unified Patent Court (UPC).

The Irides Weekly Update is our round-up of patent litigation news highlights from around the world.
 

UK

Court of Appeal stays implementer‑led RAND claims in Acer v Nokia and Asus v Nokia.
[2026] EWCA Civ 564]

On 12 May, the Court of Appeal (CoA) confirmed that the English Courts have jurisdiction over implementer‑led RAND claims relating to UK SEPs, notwithstanding that any RAND licence would be global in scope, but allowed Nokia’s appeal on case management grounds and ordered a stay of the RAND proceedings. At first instance, the issue of a case management stay was not addressed in detail but it was held to be “an egregious case management decision wholly at odds with the overriding objective of resolving disputes justly, expeditiously, fairly and at proportionate cost if these proceedings were stayed on case management grounds.” ([360], [2025] EWHC 3331 (Pat)). The first instance judge also found that the Claimants (Acer, Asus and Hisense) were justified in not consenting to arbitration.

The CoA noted that the application for a stay on case management grounds was essentially an application for summary judgment, although concluded that it did not prejudice the Claimants that the proper application was not made and that it was not procedurally unfair. The substance of the application was essentially the same: that the RAND claims should not proceed as they had no real prospect of success. 

For the RAND claims to have no real prospect of success, Nokia’s adjustable licence offers (interim licences adjustable via arbitration) needed to be capable of acceptance. At first instance, the judge found that they were not capable of acceptance as the RAND licence capable of acceptance would only be available at the end of the arbitration. Additionally, the first instance judge held the offers were not RAND because arbitration is a consensual process and the Claimants had not consented.

The CoA disagreed, finding that arbitration which followed the ICC Rules would be carried out by an “independent and impartial tribunal” and that determination by that tribunal would be RAND. Nokia’s offer was an immediate one for “whatever terms [the] tribunal ultimately determines to be RAND”. Therefore, the adjustable licence offers were on RAND terms and Nokia had complied with its RAND obligation. The Court held that, by refusing this offer, the Claimants were refusing an offer on RAND terms and were therefore not willing. The Court also noted that, while SEP holders get the choice as to what RAND terms it accepts, this choice is not available to the implementer.

The CoA therefore agreed with Nokia that there was no real prospect of success for the RAND claims and granted the case management stay subject to conditions. Those conditions include that, if Asus or Acer accept the adjustable licence offer, Nokia agrees to use the statements of case on RAND and all other disclosed documents in the UK proceedings in the arbitration and that the costs incurred by the parties in relation to the RAND claims are included as costs in the arbitration. 

Nokia had also appealed the first instance rejection of its jurisdictional challenges. The CoA dismissed Nokia’s appeal on jurisdiction, following the reasoning in Tesla v InterDigital [2025] EWCA Civ 192 that the claim passed through gateway 11 (property in the jurisdiction).

However, while ultimately of no effect given the conclusion on gateway 11, the CoA held that the RAND claims would not pass through gateway 16A, as this gateway excludes “claims for negative declarations in respect of claims which would fall within gateway 2 (claims for injunctions ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing acts within the jurisdiction).” [50]. The CoA also held that the RAND claims would not pass through gateway 4A, which relates to a further claim “arising out of the same or closely connected facts”, finding that the non-infringement case and RAND claims were not sufficiently “closely connected”.
 

Germany/China/UPC

German injunction, Chinese rate‑setting and a UPC‑led push towards settlement in ZTE v Samsung. 
[UPC_CFI_189/2025]

In an unprecedented move, the Judges in the Mannheim Local Division (LD) of the UPC have issued an order in Samsung v ZTE, which sets out two alternative settlement proposals ($640 million for a licence terminating on 31 December 2028 OR $730 million for a licence terminating on 31 December 2029) and a third option of mediation before the new Patent Mediation and Arbitration Centre (PMAC) of the UPC. The parties are ordered to provide comments on the settlement and PMAC proposals by 31 May 2026. 

This extraordinary order follows three nearly simultaneous decisions of Courts in the UK, Germany and China relating to the dispute between Samsung and ZTE as to the terms of global FRAND cross-licence. As previously report here on 5 May, the High Court of England and Wales set a lump sum of $392 million in its judgment of 1 May 2026. A judgment of the Chongqing Court, also dated 1 May 2026 and made publicly available shortly afterwards, found $731 million for a six year term was FRAND. Finally, a judgment of the Munich Regional Court (MC) (dated 30 April but not made publicly available until 6 May 2026) suggests that $640 million for a five year term would be FRAND. All sums are balancing payments to be made in favour of ZTE. 

The final numbers starkly illustrate the different approaches of the Courts to rate setting. Significantly, the ZTE-Apple (2020) licence which played a key role in the UK judgment, was not considered by Munich or Chongqing to be relevant. Whilst the UK judgment recognised (and made adjustments for) non-FRAND factors in this licence, the Chongqing Court dismissed it as a comparable on the basis of “serious financial difficulties” faced by ZTE in the years leading up to the licence; including negative cash-flow in 2018 and 2019. MC noted that it was a contract “concluded under special circumstances”.

All of the decisions are notable and represent developments within their respective jurisdictions. In particular, the MC goes far beyond the traditional approach of German Courts when assessing a FRAND defence to an injunction. In previous decisions, the German Courts have emphasised that it is not the place of the Court to set FRAND terms as this is a matter for the parties. However, in order to assess whether an implementer benefits from a FRAND defence the Court has considered whether the patentee's licensing offer falls within a FRAND "corridor". In ZTE v Samsung the Court found that ZTE's offer was within the FRAND corridor and as such Samsung's defence to an injunction failed. Unexpectedly, the MC then (having noted the dangers in doing so) made its own assessment of a sum at which the parties should settle (namely $640 million). 

Further analysis of these lengthy judgments will follow; however, it now appears that the Courts of both Munich and the UPC have joined China and the UK in being prepared to set, or at least suggest, FRAND terms in SEP disputes. 
 

USA

Massachusetts District Court rules that the reverse doctrine of equivalents remains a viable defence to patent infringement under US law.

The reverse doctrine of equivalents was recognised as a defence to patent infringement by the Supreme Court in 1898 in Westinghouse v Boyden Power Brake Co and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank v Linde Air in 1950. Essentially the defence means that, where an allegedly infringing device is changed so far in principle from the patented invention that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the reverse doctrine of equivalents may be applied to restrict the claim such that the device does not infringe the patent.

However, the Federal Circuit (FC) has been critical of the doctrine in some recent decisions, including dicta from the 2025 case of Steuben Foods v Shibuya Hoppman. In the present case between Maquet Cardiovascular v Abiomed, the Massachusetts District Court (MDC) had to opine on whether the doctrine continues to be viable and, if viable, whether it is a factual defence to be tried before a jury or an equitable defence to be tried before the Court.

The MDC acknowledged that, given the recent criticism of the doctrine by the FC, there is substantial risk that any judgment applying the doctrine would ultimately be reversed, which would be a waste of judicial and party resources. However, the case law establishing the doctrine has not yet been overturned and the MDC must apply the law as it exists. If the reverse doctrine of equivalents is to be abolished or limited, this is the prerogative of the FC and, ultimately, the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the MDC has no alternative but to assume that the defence continues to exist. 

It was also determined that the defence presents a question of fact that must be tried by a jury. The determination of whether the evidence in the present case supports the application of the reverse doctrine of equivalence was deferred until trial. 
 

UK

Novo Nordisk awarded blocking injunction against websites offering counterfeit and unlicensed medicines. 
[Novo Nordisk v BT & ors]

On 13 May 2026, the High Court issued the reasons for its 2 October 2025 decision to grant a website blocking injunction to Novo Nordisk against four target websites which had been offering, selling, and supplying counterfeit and unlicensed medicines including semaglutide – the GLP-1 receptor agonist which is the active ingredient in Novo Nordisk’s best-selling Ozempic® and Wegovy® medications. The respondents were six internet service providers who did not appear at the October 2025 hearing and did not oppose the application.

This was the first website blocking injunction application in the UK concerned with the supply of counterfeit and unlicensed prescription-only medicinal products. The advertising and offering for sale of unlicensed prescription-only medicines is a criminal offence under the Human Medicine Regulations 2012 (HMR).

Mellor J confirmed that the offences committed under the HMR comprised sufficient wrongdoing to engage the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to grant the blocking injunction. Novo Nordisk also had the necessary standing to obtain the injunction, not least because of the support and encouragement from the MHRA (the UK medicines regulator) for the application. The MHRA had contacted Novo Nordisk asking for assistance after it was unsuccessful in previous attempts to take down one of the websites. In addition to breaches of the HMR, Novo Nordisk alleged infringement of various trade marks and passing off in support of its application.

The Court was “entirely satisfied” by Novo Nordisk’s allegations of infringement of their registered trade marks and passing off, and that the target websites were engaged in systematic contraventions of the HMR. The evidence also clearly established the harms and dangers to patients posed by falsified semaglutide products of the kind offered by the target websites. As Novo Nordisk is the only authorised supplier of semaglutide in the UK and EU, its goodwill and reputation could also be harmed by adverse patient reactions to falsified products. Although the target websites offered products not associated with Novo Nordisk, the evidence established that these were also unlicensed prescription-only medicines, controlled substances or infringements of third party rights whose marketing and sale was unlawful.

In all the circumstances, granting the blocking injunction was proportionate to protect Novo Nordisk’s rights as well as public health. 
 

UPC

Lisbon Local Division provides guidance on revocation of expired patents and online infringement. 
[Ericsson v AsusTek UPC_CFI_757/2024, UPC_CFI_539/2025]

On 6 May 2026, the Lisbon LD found that Ericsson had successfully established infringement of its Wi-Fi related patent EP 2 819 131 against AsusTek.

The case concerned laptops and notebooks incorporating Intel Wi‑Fi 6 and Wi‑Fi 6E modules. Ericsson alleged that AsusTek infringed through its various European‑facing websites. AsusTek counterclaimed for revocation and denied infringement, arguing both that the patent was invalid and that it was not responsible for the relevant acts relied upon by Ericsson.

A procedural point addressed at the outset was whether AsusTek had a legal interest in pursuing a counterclaim for revocation given that the patent had expired before the counterclaim was made. Ericsson argued that the counterclaim should be dismissed on that basis. The Court rejected this argument, holding that where an infringement action concerns acts occurring prior to expiry and the possibility of retroactive damages arises, a defendant retains a legitimate legal interest in seeking revocation.

On the merits, AsusTek’s extensive validity attacks failed. Although the patent as granted was found to contain added matter, that deficiency was overcome by Ericsson’s first auxiliary request. The Court rejected all novelty and inventive step objections based on the cited prior art, and therefore dismissed the counterclaim for revocation in its entirety. AsusTek’s technical non‑infringement arguments were also unsuccessful.

The Court then considered acts of infringement via websites and sub‑domains. AsusTek, which is the parent company of the ASUS group, argued that it could not be liable for offering or placing infringing products on the market for two reasons. First, the global website (www.asus.com) was not located in the UPC territory and did not include pricing or offer products for sale. Second, although AsusTek owned the local sub-domains for each country, it did not exercise operational control over the content of those local sites; the content of those pages was the responsibility of a local affiliate instead.

The Court rejected both arguments. In Belkin v Philips, the CoA decided that an offer is to be understood in an economic sense and not purely as a legally binding contractual offer. The presentation of products on www.asus.com in a manner that allows customers to inform themselves and proceed to acquisition was sufficient to constitute an offer, even if no price is shown and no direct purchase mechanism is provided.

The Court also found that the owner of a sub‑domain is responsible for the content of that sub‑domain, as “enterprises are liable for the acts of their representatives”. Therefore, AsusTek could not disclaim responsibility for infringing offers made through websites it owned, even if day‑to‑day management was delegated to affiliates.

The Court held that AsusTek was liable to Ericsson for damages, with the quantum to be determined in separate proceedings. Despite that bifurcation, the Court ordered AsusTek to provide detailed information on the quantities of infringing products sold and the prices obtained. Rejecting AsusTek’s argument that such disclosure should await the damages phase, the Court held that Art. 67 UPCA expressly permits an information order even where damages are to be assessed separately, since such information is necessary to enable proper calculation of damages. AsusTek was ordered to provide the information within ten weeks, backed by a coercive penalty for non-compliance.
 

UPC

Düsseldorf Local Division rejects request for preliminary injunction amid doubts over infringement and urgency. 
[Ottobock v MedEnvoy, UPC_CFI_1928/2025]

On 7 May 2026, the Düsseldorf LD refused Ottobock’s application for provisional measures concerning EP 3 001 984, finding that neither urgency nor infringement was established with the requisite degree of certainty. The application, filed in December 2025, was dismissed in its entirety, with costs awarded against the applicant.

On infringement, the Court was not persuaded that the respondents’ microprocessor controlled prosthetic knee implemented the claimed method. In particular, it was not satisfied that the accused system met the requirement to compare detected parameters of the appliance with criteria stored in a computer unit reflecting a natural movement pattern of climbing stairs. The Court therefore concluded that it “could not establish whether claim element 1.2(b) had been met”, which was sufficient to defeat the application for provisional measures.

The Court also found that urgency was not demonstrated. It reiterated that “the applicant bears, in principle, the burden of proof regarding the acquisition of knowledge of the existence of the contested embodiment, the potential infringement and its prompt clarification”, and that the relevant period extends from the time at which the applicant becomes aware of the potentially infringing product until all facts and evidence necessary to substantiate the infringement are obtained.

The Court emphasised that urgency may be undermined not only by actual knowledge but also by constructive knowledge. In particular, awareness by the applicant of the potentially infringing product must be assumed if, “according to conventional understanding and the ordinary course of events, the applicant should have been aware of the potentially infringing characteristics”. Once aware of the product, the applicant is under a duty to pursue technical clarification expeditiously.

On the facts, the applicants had been aware of public product launches, trade fair presentations and marketing activities since the first half of 2025. The Court considered that Ottobock had not convincingly explained why procurement and technical investigation were not initiated sooner, particularly given the availability of information and trained specialists within its own supply network. In those circumstances, the Court could not exclude that the claimant waited too long to file the application, with the result that urgency was not established. Provisional measures were therefore refused on this basis also. 
 

UPC

Brussels Local Division sets costs ceiling for PI proceedings and clarifies waiver and interpretation of cost rules. [Yealink v Barco UPC_CFI_2265/2025]

On 7 May 2026, the Brussels LD issued a cost decision under r. 150 RoP arising from Preliminary Injunction (PI) proceedings (UPC_CFI_582/2024) and related appeal proceedings (UPC_CoA_317/2025 and UPC_CoA_376/2025) concerning EP 3 732 827. Barco’s PI requests had been dismissed at both instances for lack of urgency. However, Barco had been successful in challenging the competence issues advanced by Yealink as a preliminary objection at first instance and as a cross-appeal. Yealink sought a total of €237,257.84 in costs; Barco argued the net amount payable should be €72,000.

The Court confirmed Yealink as the successful party overall, while accepting that Barco was entitled to raise its own costs for successfully defending the competence challenges as a defence in the cost proceedings — without needing to file a separate application — on grounds of procedural efficiency and consistency with Art. 41(3) UPCA. The Court held that Barco's earlier concession that Yealink was the "successful party" at first instance did not amount to a waiver of its right to seek compensation for those costs: waiver requires an explicit statement from the rights-holder.

On the costs ceiling, the Court accepted the undisputed first instance ceiling of €112,000 but reduced the appeal ceiling by 50% to €66,000, drawing on Guideline 5(b) of the Administrative Committee's Guidelines on recoverable costs, which provides that PI proceedings should be valued at 66% of the merits value, and balancing that against Barco's prior acceptance of the full ceiling at first instance. The Court rejected Barco's argument that a single ceiling of €112,000 should apply across both instances, finding that approach would effectively award nothing for the appeal. However, the LD allowed a further set-off against the total ceiling of €178,000 for some of Barco’s legal representation costs and other hearing costs, based on Barco’s partial success challenging the competence arguments.

The LD dismissed Yealink's claim for simultaneous interpretation costs. The LD held that engaging an interpreter through the court mechanism under r. 109.2 RoP preserves recoverability; instructing one independently does not. Travel and hotel costs were allowed in full. 
 

UK

IPO issues Corporate Plan for 2026 to 2027, focusing on SEP and AI.

The Intellectual Property Office has published its Corporate Plan for 2026 to 2027, setting out its policy priorities for the final year of its current strategy. The plan is focused on delivery and consolidation, with the IPO emphasising its role in supporting innovation, investment and economic growth through a modern, trusted and effective IP system.

A central theme is continued work to strengthen the UK IP framework in response to technological change. In particular, the plan highlights further progress on reforms relating to SEPs, reflecting the government’s intention to develop a more balanced and effective framework for SEP licensing and enforcement. This includes measures aimed at improving transparency in licensing, increasing certainty around SEP essentiality, and addressing inefficiencies in dispute resolution. Alongside this, the IPO will continue its work on AI and copyright, supporting the government’s chosen policy approach and seeking to ensure that the UK framework remains fit for purpose for both technology developers and the creative industries. Full details of the plan can be found here.

New episodes: You, Me and the UPC: Case by case

Episode 55: Mannheim Local Division grants Nokia ex parte anti-suit injunction in relation to Chinese interim licence application

Episode 56: The Hague Local Division dismisses Stratasys Preliminary Injunction application following narrow claim construction on purge towers