Irides: Weekly global patent litigation update

This edition features updates from: The UK, Canada and the Unified Patent Court (UPC).

The Irides Weekly Update is our round-up of patent litigation news highlights from around the world.
 

UK

Supreme Court allows Tesla’s appeal and confirms jurisdiction to determine FRAND rates for SEP holders in pool or platform joint licensing. 
[Tesla v InterDigital [2026] UKSC 27]

The UK Supreme Court has decided that the UK Court has jurisdiction to determine a claim challenging the FRAND rates offered by SEP holders as part of pool or platform joint licensing. In this case, Tesla had brought proactive proceedings to enforce the FRAND obligations of SEP holder InterDigital (a member of the Avanci 5G Platform) to seek a decision from the UK Court as to whether that Avanci 5G Platform licence rate is FRAND.

The First Instance Court and Court of Appeal (CoA) (previously reported here) declined jurisdiction to determine Tesla's licensing claims, but the Supreme Court has now overturned the decision meaning that Tesla can now continue to pursue the claims before the English Court. 

Key findings by the Supreme Court:

• FRAND obligation on joint licensing: there is a serious issue to be tried that a SEP owner is subject to the FRAND obligation when choosing to offer a licence of their SEPs though a licensing pool or platform.

• FRAND licence to the whole platform: for an SEP owner that is a member of the platform, there is a serious issue to be tried as to whether the FRAND licence of their SEPs is a licence to the platform rather than a bilateral licence (i.e. Tesla has a real prospect of establishing that the only FRAND licence for InterDigital SEPs is a global licence to the Avanci 5G Platform).

• Declarations as to FRAND rate for the platform licence: Tesla has a real prospect of being granted the declarations it sought, including whether the Avanci 5G Platform rate is FRAND and, if not, what the FRAND rate is. 

• Jurisdiction: the claims in question are properly characterised as concerning a FRAND licence in respect of InterDigital's UK SEPs, notwithstanding that Tesla argues that only a global platform-wide licence would be FRAND. As such, the UK Court has jurisdiction over the claims.

• Appropriate forum: there is no more appropriate forum to determine the claims. In the parallel proceedings before the Delaware Court of Chancery, the Court would not, on the balance of probabilities, determine a FRAND rate based on non-US patents.  
   

Canada

Supreme Court of Canada clarifies the patentability of methods for medical treatment. 
[Pharmascience v Janssen, 2026 SCC 26]

On 17 July 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) handed down its decision in Pharmascience v Janssen. The dispute related to Janssen’s patent for dosing regimens for a long-acting injectable form of paliperidone palmitate (sold as Invega Sustenna® by Janssen) used to treat schizophrenia and related disorders.

Pharmascience had sought to invalidate the patent on the basis that the claims were to methods of medical treatment, and therefore contained unpatentable subject matter. However, Pharmascience’s arguments were rejected by the Federal Court and the CoA.

In a split decision, the majority of the SCC found that although methods of medical treatment were not patentable in Canada because professional skills are unpatentable, a patent would only claim a method of treatment if it sought to monopolise professional medical skill and judgement. The SCC, noting that the question of whether the subject matter of an invention would amount to professional medical skill or judgement, proposed three factors which may guide the analysis:

• The analysis should focus on whether the subject matter of the claimed invention amounts to professional medical skill and judgement, not whether professional medical skill and judgement would be applied in selecting the claimed invention for a particular patient or use.

• The more the subject matter involves tailoring treatment to individual patients, the more likely it would be that it amounts to a method of medial treatment. Where an invention can be applied generally to a broad class of patients without individual adjustment, it is less likely to be a method of medical treatment.

• The more a medical professional would be incentivised to develop or improve a given subject matter in the course of their professional practice, the more likely it is that the subject matter amounts to a method of medical treatment. 

The minority, however, suggested that the majority’s suggested “skill-and-judgement” test was unclear, and preferred to apply the same test as any other claimed invention, by determining whether the subject matter of the claim fits the definition of “invention” in the Canadian Patent Act. 

Despite their differing approaches, both the majority and the minority found that Janssen’s dosing patent did claim patentable subject matter. The majority held that once the decision to implement the claimed dosing regimen was made, the physician was not required to use their professional skill and judgement to implement those regimens. Pharmascience’s appeal was therefore unanimously rejected.
 

 UPC

Düsseldorf Local Division clarifies the scope of NDAs in FRAND negotiations.
[InterDigital v Walt Disney UPC_CFI_87/2025 et al.]

On 23 July 2026, the Düsseldorf Local Division issued its decision in InterDigital v The Walt Disney, finding that Disney had infringed InterDigital’s patent EP 2 449 782, which relates to the signalling of intra prediction information in video encoding and bitstreams. Disney’s counterclaim for revocation failed, as the patent was found not to contain added matter and the claims were held to be both novel and inventive over the cited prior art.  

The Court rejected Disney’s FRAND defence. Disney failed to demonstrate that InterDigital held a dominant position (which was necessary for its competition law defence) and that the asserted patents were a part of a de jure standard or a de facto standard. As the asserted claims were not essential to the HEVC standard they were not covered by the relevant FRAND declaration (which was limited solely to claims which were essential). 

Despite these findings, the Court also applied the principles established in the European Court Justice’s 2015 decision in Huawei v ZTE. The Court was unable to examine the infringement notification or InterDigital’s initial licence offer as Disney refused to amend the relevant NDA between the parties. The Court held that since Disney had prevented the examination it must be assumed that notice of infringement was given and that InterDigital’s offer complied with FRAND terms. Therefore, Disney would have been considered an unwilling licensee under the Huawei v ZTE principles.
 

UPC

Court of Appeal clarifies the method for calculating Court fees in appeals in accordance with R. 220.1(a) RoP.
[Qualcomm v Network System Technologies UPC_CoA_68/2026 et al].

On 15 July 2026, the CoA issued an order in proceedings between Qualcomm and Network System Technologies, clarifying aspects of the how UPC Court fees should be calculated when filing appeal proceedings.

The dispute concerned the calculation and payment of appeal fees in proceedings where Network System Technologies (NST) had commenced infringement proceedings against Qualcomm entities and Samsung relating to three patents, and counterclaims for revocation of these patents had been commenced by Qualcomm. The infringement actions against Samsung were subsequently withdrawn.

The CoA confirmed that appeal fees for counterclaims for revocation under r. 220.1(a) RoP must be calculated by reference to the fee payable for filing a counterclaim for revocation in the first instance at the time of filing the appeal (thus making it necessary to take into account the amended Table of Court Fees), increased by 10%. The Court confirmed that Qualcomm had therefore paid the correct court fee and was not entitled to any reimbursement.

The Court also provided useful guidance on the valuation of infringement claims. NST argued that the value of the infringement appeals should be reduced because Samsung was no longer a party to the proceedings. The Court held that parties cannot unilaterally reduce the value of the action for fee purposes simply because they disagree with the valuation adopted at first instance. Any challenge to that valuation must be pursued as part of the appeal itself. Although the Court acknowledged that a different value may in some cases be appropriate on appeal, that assessment is for the Court, after hearing the respondent, and not for the parties acting unilaterally.

The Court concluded that as the value of the infringement action had been determined by the Court of First Instance when the action against Samsung had already been withdrawn, this did not justify a lower value of the case on appeal and thus a lower amount of fees. The Court therefore ordered NST to pay outstanding fees in the three infringement appeals within 14 days, failing which those appeals would be rejected as inadmissible under r. 229.4 RoP. 

The decision is a reminder that compliance with the UPC’s fee regime is a substantive procedural requirement, rather than a mere administrative formality. Underpayment may ultimately result in an appeal being rejected as inadmissible, making careful fee calculations essential where questions of valuation arise.
 

New episodes: You, Me and the UPC: Case by case

Episode 76: Court of Appeal provides guidance on orders for the production of evidence under R.190 RoP

Episode 77: Local Division overturns ex parte injunction granted in November in relation to protective head gear