Irides: Weekly global patent litigation update

This edition features updates from: Germany, The Unified Patent Court (UPC) na d the European Union (EU)

The Irides Weekly Update is our round-up of patent litigation news highlights from around the world.

Germany

Munich Court confirm Anti-Interim License Injunction against Amazon.

On 26 November 2025, the Munich Regional Court confirmed its Preliminary Injunction (PI) against Amazon, preventing it from applying for a declaration or specific performance of an interim licence in the UK High Court which would cover German patent rights. 

This was an objection by Amazon to the PI granted against it in September, and followed the ex parte AASI obtained by Amazon in the UK proceedings to attempt to protect the main rate-setting determination from other ASIs. 

The Court held that an interim licence would infringe InterDigital’s patent rights in Germany, as even a declaration would have consequences in the UK proceedings which would pressure InterDigital into accepting the interim licence. In considering whether Amazon’s conduct gave rise to a risk of impending infringement of InterDigital’s patent rights, the Court held that the key question was whether Amazon had agreed not to pursue an interim licence, rather than whether it was actively pursuing an application for an interim licence – Amazon did not provide this assurance so a risk of imminent infringement was assumed. 

The Court also stated that the proceedings before the UK High Court were not impacted by its injunction and it did not see why an interim licence would be necessary to protect the main proceedings in the UK, as Amazon had argued. The Court also clarified that the injunction was not against Amazon seeking an interim licence in general, but only one which would affect German patent rights (such as a worldwide interim licence).
 

UPC

Court of Appeal rejects Vivo’s request to stay first instance proceedings pending a preliminary objection decision.
[UPC-COA-0000904/2025, UPC-COA-0000905/2025]

On 27 November 2025, the Court of Appeal rejected an application to stay proceedings under r. 21.2 RoP, specifically relating to staying deadlines.

Sun Patent Trust (SPT) had brought infringement actions against Vivo in the Paris Local Division which requested an injunction to restrain Vivo if it did not enter a FRAND licence. Vivo had filed a preliminary objection and requested that the deadlines for its Statement of Defence and Counterclaim for Revocation be stayed until the preliminary objection decision had become final. The request to extend the deadlines was denied at first instance.

The Court of Appeal found that the period for lodging a Statement of Defence should not be affected by the lodging of a preliminary objection. However, if there was an appeal against a decision or order regarding a preliminary objection, then the main proceedings can be stayed on a “reasoned request”, so the Court had the power to grant a stay under “exceptional circumstances”.

The fact that Vivo’s preliminary objection (related to jurisdiction) had never been decided before and was allegedly of “controversial discussion among scholars” did not constitute “exceptional circumstances”. Additionally, Vivo’s interest in avoiding costs (for preparing its Statement of Defence) did not outweigh SPT’s interest in obtaining an infringement decision without delay. 
 

UPC

Alignment on the test for inventive step from the Court of Appeal. 
[UPC_CoA_464/2024] 

On 25 November, the Court of Appeal (CoA) issued its decision in the Meril v Edwards Lifesciences appeal concerning Edwards’ patent to prosthetic heart valves (EP 3 646 825).  In short, the Court upheld the first instance decisions insofar as the Edwards' patent should be maintained in amended form and Meril's prosthetic heart valve infringed the patent.  Notably, the Court adopted the same "holistic" approach for assessing inventive step as set out the in Amgen v Sanofi and Regeneron decision (which was handed down on the same day albeit from a different CoA panel, previously reported here). This alignment from the two panels indicates that a concerted effort has been made by the CoA to harmonise the test for inventive step in the UPC.

Background

In June 2023, Edwards issued infringement proceedings against Meril DE and Meril IN in the Munich Local Division (LD).  Shortly thereafter, in August 2023, Meril IT issued a revocation action in the Paris Central Division (CD).  In November 2023, Meril DE and Meril IN counterclaimed for revocation; these counterclaims were transferred to the revocation action in the CD.  After the patent was maintained in amended form by the CD in July 2024, the LD found that Meril’s “Myval” valves infringed the patent and ordered injunctive relief in November 2024.  

Appeal

The CoA decision deals with multiple procedural and substantive appeals.  For brevity, this update shall address a selection of the issues.

In deciding the substantive appeals, the Court provided guidance on claim construction.  Whilst embodiments in the specification will typically fall within the claim, that is not necessarily the case in circumstances where the specification teaches that a specific embodiment is not claimed.  In this instance, Meril sought to argue that certain embodiments in the specification which included rhomboid cells fell within the claim.  The Court held that the claim is limited to valves made up entirely of hexagonal cells, meaning that the rhomboid cell embodiments did not fall within the claim.  This finding was particularly relevant to the assessment of inventive step. 

As it did in Amgen v Sanofi and Regeneron, the CoA set out the test for inventive step.  First, the object of the invention (i.e. the objective problem) should be identified on the basis of the teaching of the patent.  To avoid hindsight, this should not include pointers to the claimed solution.  The claim will be obvious from a realistic starting point if the skilled person would arrive at the claimed solution as a routine next step. A realistic starting point is a teaching that would have been of interest to the skilled person, may address a similar problem to the claimed solution and/or may include similar features to the claimed solution.  The skilled person requires a pointer or motivation from the prior art and it is a question of whether they “would” arrive at the claimed solution (rather than “could”).

In the context of this case, the Court held that the objective problem is the improvement of the design of a balloon-expandable transcatheter prosthetic heart valve.  This is achieved by reducing the crimping profile of the valve and providing stability during crimping and subsequent expansion by using valves with entirely hexagonal cells. The key prior art, Levi, discloses prosthetic heart valves comprising layers of rhomboid and hexagonal cells.  Levi teaches that different parts of the valve with different functions should have different cell structures. The combination of hexagonal cells and rhomboid cells has multiple benefits in relation to the overall dimensions of the valve, providing structure to the leaflet and reducing the crimping profile.  The Court held it would go against the teaching of Levi to replace the rhomboid cells with hexagonal cells, meaning that the claimed solution was not obvious.  Meril’s other inventive step attacks failed for similar reasons.  The Court also dismissed Meril’s arguments on appeal relating to added matter, clarity, novelty and non-infringement.

In the context of the procedural disputes, the CoA provided guidance on the following issues:  

• Competence: Edwards appealed the finding that the CD was competent to hear the revocation action in circumstances where the infringement action between the same parties on the same patent was already pending in the LD. In addition, it argued that the CD action constituted an abuse of right.  In dismissing this appeal, the CoA noted that “same parties” under Art. 33(4) UPCA means identical parties.  Different Meril entities were party to the two actions such that a decision in one action would not be res judicata against the other parties.  Further, the CD action did not constitute an abuse insofar as Meril IT distributed products in Italy and therefore had a legitimate interest in bringing an action.   
• Application to amend the patent: Meril appealed the decision to allow Edwards' application to amend the patent. This was Edwards' third application to do so, having filed one with its defence to the revocation action and a second in response to the counterclaims to revocation (this was inadmissible on the basis of being too broad and the judge-rapporteur suggested Edwards narrowed its request).  The Court dismissed Meril’s appeal on the basis that Edwards could not have introduced the amendments any earlier in proceedings and the application did not hinder Meril in preparing for the revocation action hearing.  In doing so, it noted that the first instance court has discretion when deciding to admit such an application, whereas the review by the Court is limited.   
• Application to amend the scope of the claim: the Court refused Edwards’ appeal against the Munich Local Division’s refusal to amend Edwards’ claim for injunctive relief to include Romania, following its ratification of the UPCA.  Edwards could not satisfy the Court that the amendment could not have been made with reasonable diligence at an earlier stage.  Ratification occurred on 1 September 2024, but Edwards did not indicate its intent to amend its claim until 24 September 2024 at the oral hearing and neglected to mention it at an earlier interim conference on 5 September.  Such delay would have unreasonably hindered Meril in preparing its defence, as it would have had to conduct fact investigation.
• Limitation of injunction: Meril offers certain XL valves that Edwards does not.  The LD held that there is a legitimate interest in the availability of Meril’s XL valves. For the use of such valves to be excepted from the injunction, the LD ordered that patient data must be submitted to an Edwards portal to allow Edwards doctors to confirm that the patient cannot be treated with an Edwards valve.  On appeal, the Court did not consider that this adequately addressed the legitimate interest, insofar as it requires Edwards to maintain the portal and make the assessment.  The Court adjusted the requirements for the exception, such that notification of intention to use the Meril XL valve from a physician confirming that such product is the only available treatment option for a particular patient is sufficient.
   

UPC

Court of Appeal dismisses Provisional Measures Application due to lack of urgency and finds no hierarchy among different grounds for territorial competence.  
[UPC_CoA_317/2025, UPC_CoA_376/2025]

On 28 November 2025, the Court of Appeal (CoA) issued an order in an appeal and cross-appeal in the dispute between Barco and Yealink, emanating from a request for provisional measures heard by the Brussels Local Division. The dispute centred on the protected subject matter of EP 3 732 827, namely  methods and systems for making functional devices available to participants of meetings, as well as software for carrying out such methods. A diverse range of questions were at issue in the appeal and cross-appeal including the competence of different divisions of the UPC in the context of the interplay between Art. 33(1)(a) and Art. 33(1)(b) UPCA, how urgency is to be assessed during the grant procedure at the EPO, and how interim costs are to be handled.

On competence, the CoA upheld the first instance decision and dismissed Yealink’s cross-appeal in this regard, finding the Brussels Local Division competent to hear the case. The Court clarified that UPC internal competence (Art. 33 UPCA) is not governed by the Brussels I Recast Regulation and that there is no hierarchy between competence based on the place of infringement (Art. 33(1)(a) UPCA) and the defendant’s domicile (Art. 33(1)(b) UPCA).

With respect to urgency, the Court also upheld the first instance court’s dismissal of Barco’s application for provisional measures on the basis of lack of urgency. The Court found that Barco could have acted sooner after the patent grant and did not exercise sufficient diligence, meaning provisional relief was not warranted. The Court noted that Barco and their validation representative did not appear to have acted with the requisite urgency when completing the unitary patent registration process and that Barco could have made its test purchases prior to the registration of the unitary patent. Both considerations argued against a finding that the claimant had demonstrated the requisite urgency.

On costs, the Court took the view that granting an interim award up to the applicable ceiling makes the costs determination procedures under r.150 RoP effectively redundant, and opined that an interim award of costs of up to equal to half of the ceiling is generally more appropriate.
 

EU

Parliament majority votes to sue EC over SEP reg withdrawal.

On 25 November 2025, the European Parliament voted to bring legal action in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against the European Commission following the Commission’s decision to withdraw its proposed regulation on Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). The proposal, first introduced in 2023, was aimed to improve transparency and predictability in SEP licensing. Whilst the proposal was welcomed by some, it was vigorously opposed by others. The Parliament had adopted the proposal with its own amendments in 2024, but after reported deadlock on the issue at the European Council, the Commission withdrew the draft in early 2025, citing “no foreseeable agreement” between co-legislators. 

The plenary vote was narrowly passed (334–294), reflecting the ongoing deep division on the issue. Notably, support and opposition did not align strictly with political groupings, indicating the complexity of the issue. The legal challenge aims to reverse the withdrawal, but a decision is not expected before 2027. If the Court annuls the withdrawal, the original proposal could return to the legislative process, which would take some further considerable time. In the meantime, other measures to address some of the perceived frictions in SEP licensing have been initiated, such as the pledge by several major SEP holders to commit to WIPO mediation, if necessary, when licensing their SEPs to SMEs in IoT industries. It is unclear whether supporters expect the SEP proposal to still be relevant by the time the Court overturns the withdrawal (if indeed it does so), or if the lawsuit is mainly intended to keep up pressure for reform. 

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